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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the response of banks to privatization. Using data on all state-owned banks 
for the period 1990-2006, the findings indicate that fully state-owned banks are significantly less 
profitable than partially privatized ones. The improvements in performance by partially privatized 
banks are, in fact, sustained after privatization. In addition, the analysis indicates that privatization 
improves profitability, efficiency and improves bank soundness, while lowering bank risk. While 
the improvement in bank risk is typically spread out over a much longer period, the progress in 
terms of profitability and economic efficiency typically occurs in the post-privatization period.  
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How did state-owned banks respond to privatization? 
Evidence from the Indian experiment 
 
1 Introduction 
Privatization of public enterprises has generated much debate in developing countries 
which had previously opted for planning as a strategy of development. Under the Five Year 
Plans, the Indian state took upon itself the responsibility to undertake investments in basic and 
strategic economic activities and control and direct the private sector through a network of 
regulatory institutions. After pursuance of planned development for nearly half a century, a stage 
was reached when questions were raised about the relevance of the planned development 
strategy (see, for instance, Kochhar et al, 2006). After a period of debate and discussion, the 
process was reflected in a gradual lowering of the share of the government in state-owned 
enterprises, although the state retained ownership control, a process alternately referred to as 
‘divestment’ or ‘partial privatization’ (Gupta, 2005).  
Another important aspect of the privatization process has been the gradual scaling down 
of government ownership in state-owned banks (SOBs). In a cross-country study, La Porta et al. 
(2002) found that 42% of equity of top ten banks was government-owned in an average country. 
Such government ownership of banks has been empirically found to be detrimental to growth 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002). Widespread privatization in recent decades has 
generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm performance. 
Barth et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence which suggests that government ownership of 
banks is associated with a low level of financial development. Beck and Levine (2002) fail to 
discern any positive effect of government ownership of banks on economic growth. The negative 
effect on development is not the only cost of government ownership of banks. Caprio and 
Martinez Peria (2000) show that higher state-ownership of banks is associated with higher 
spread, lower lendable resources and reduced stock market activity. These effects are often likely 
to persist because banking is one of the very few sectors where privatization has made limited 
inroads around the world (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
In this paper, we report evidence on the performance of fully government-owned (FGO) 
and partially government-owned (PGO) banking firms, focusing on India as a case study. More 
specifically, we address three sets of questions. First, is there any evidence to suggest 
performance differentials between PGO and FGO banks? Accordingly, we examine not only the 
quantum, but also the static and selection effects associated with privatization. Second, the 
privatization of banks occurred at different time points over the sample period. It, therefore, 
remains an open question as to whether the benefits of privatization are sustained over a period 
of time, an aspect we address in the study Third, do banks report artificially inflated earnings prior 
to privatization?  
The recent economic crisis has led policymakers to reassess the role of the state vis-à-
vis the market, especially in the financial services industry. Leading banks and mortgage lenders 
across countries have been brought under state ownership (Bernanke, 2009). This has been 
buttressed with increase in quantum of deposits guaranteed. In the US, several leading banks, 
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which had received substantial capital infusions from the governments during the heydays of the 
crisis, have since returned a significant portion of the resources back to the exchequer. 
In contrast to the privatization experiences of several other countries, the privatization in 
the Indian case was “partial” in the sense that ownership of the bank was broad-based through 
sale of minority equity stake, but the control still remained with the government.2 Therefore, unlike 
the case of full privatization where both ownership and control shift to the private sector, in this 
case, the shares are traded on the stock exchange, while the firm remains under government 
control. Because of this intermediate position between full state ownership and complete private 
shareholding, it is able to provide useful insights into the relative benefits of the political versus 
managerial view in impacting firm performance.    
India offers a reasonable laboratory among emerging markets to examine this aspect in a 
comprehensive fashion. First, India is one of the largest and fastest growing developing countries 
with a rich history of banking sector controls (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). These controls 
have gradually been relaxed, enabling a greater role for market forces in resource allocation by 
banks. Second, India is one of the few emerging economies for which a comprehensive and 
reliable database of SOBs is available over an extended time span, permitting rigorous statistical 
analysis.  
To examine this issue, the paper exploits relevant banking data for 1990-2006 to 
ascertain the impact of partial privatization on the performance of state-owned banks. The 
findings indicate that a lowering of government holding improves bank performance, judged in 
terms of alternate privatization measures employed. 
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. A brief overview of the evolving 
literature in this area is reviewed in what follows. The data and methodology is detailed thereafter 
followed by a discussion of the results. The final section concludes.   
 
2  Literature 
Private ownership of firms is considered to promote efficiency. The political view argues 
that the political interference can distort the objectives and constraints faced by managers and 
thereby, the transfer of management control to private owners is likely to address the attendant 
inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The managerial view, on the 
other hand, contends that privatization improves performance because state-owned firms have 
difficulty monitoring managers (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Widespread privatization in recent 
decades has generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm 
performance. Partial privatization - where the government remains the controlling owner - is of 
particular empirical interest because of the insight it offers into the long-standing debate over why 
state-owned firms perform poorly.  
It has been argued that the greater the dispersion in the equity ownership of the firm, the 
higher the incentives for the owners to free ride on each other’s efforts to monitor the 
management of the firm. As Crama et al. (2003) observe, this effect in turn, is compounded by 
two factors. First, since the nature of main holders varies across countries, the ability to exert 
                                                 
2 Boubakri et al. (2005, 2008) refers to this process as revenue privatization.  
 4
control could differ across shareholder categories. The second is the complexity of ownership 
structures across countries. To address the attendant agency costs, mechanisms have been 
developed in most countries to segregate ownership (“cash flow rights”) and control (“voting 
rights”). Empirical evidence presented by Crama et al (2003) indicates that, when control over the 
management of a corporation is divided among important shareholders, the best strategy is to 
agree on maximizing profits rather than fight over complex objectives often associated with public 
control or with control in the hands of one single party. This could especially be relevant in 
developing economies where inadequacies in the financial system – underdeveloped capital 
markets, weak bankruptcy procedures and the associated legal deficiencies – are quite 
commonplace (Caves, 1990; Adam et al., 1992).   
In the Indian context, studies have primarily focused on effect of deregulation and 
liberalization on bank efficiency (Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Sarkar and Kumbhakar, 2003), 
focusing, in particular, whether and to what extent, the liberalization of financial sector, exerted 
any perceptible influence on efficiency (see Mohan, 2006 for a review). This needs to be viewed 
in conjunction with the differential ownership profile of banks. Early studies (Sarkar et al., 1998) 
found weak evidence to suggest that ownership was an important determinant of performance. 
More recent research report differences in efficiency of Indian commercial banks with across 
ownership, size and asset quality (Das and Ghosh, 2009).   
The study which comes closest to the spirit of the present paper is Gupta (2005). Using 
data on non-financial firms for 1990-2000, the analysis examines the effect of partial privatization 
on performance. The analysis reveals that privatization leads to performance improvements. 
Although there are certain similarities between the present study and Gupta (2005), there are 
also important differences. First and foremost, unlike Gupta (2005), which focuses on non-
financial firms, we examine this issue in case of banking firms. Second and as an upshot of the 
previous point, the variables of interest are significantly different across the two sets of studies. 
We explore, in addition to the impact of equity dilution, the static and selection effects associated 
with privatization. Contextually, we also examine the channels through which performance 
improved in these banks, an under-researched aspect in most studies on bank privatization. We 
study the time frame over which privatization benefits accrue to banks, an aspect not addressed 
in Gupta (2005).  
 
3  Indian banking system: An overview  
The Indian banking system is characterized by a large number of banks with mixed 
ownership.3 The commercial banking segment presently comprises of 28 SOBs in which 
government has majority equity stake, 29 private sector banks, including 8 de novo private banks 
and 30 foreign banks. Total bank assets constituted around 80% of GDP in 2005-06. State-
owned banks had a 72% share in the assets of the banking system in 2006, while private and 
                                                 
3The banking system in India comprises of commercial and co-operative banks, of which the former accounts for 95% of 
banking system assets. The commercial banks, in turn, comprise of the 27 state-owned banks (SOBs). These banks 
account for, on average, around 75% of commercial banking assets. An erstwhile de novo private bank was amalgamated 
with its state-owned development counterpart to create a new state-owned bank in 2005, taking the number of SOBs to 
28. In addition, there are the old private banks (operative prior to economic reforms), the de novo private banks 
(established post reforms beginning 1994-95) and the foreign banks.  
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foreign banks constituted the remaining. In 1990, state-owned banks' share in total banking 
system assets was a little over 90%.  
Prior to the initiation of financial sector reforms in 1992, the Indian financial system 
essentially catered to the needs of planned development where the government sector had a 
predominant role in every sphere of economic activity. The pre-emption of a large proportion of 
bank deposits in the form of reserves and an administered interest rate regime resulted in high 
cost and low quality financial intermediation. The system of administered interest rates was 
characterized by detailed regulatory prescriptions on lending and deposit, leading to a multiplicity 
of interest rates. As a result, the spreads between deposit and lending rates of commercial banks 
increased, while the administered lending rates did not factor in credit risk. The lack of recognition 
of the importance of transparency, accountability and prudential norms in the operations of the 
banking system led also to a rising burden of non-performing assets. On the expenditure front, 
inflexibility in licensing of branches and management structures constrained the operational 
independence and functional autonomy of banks and raised overhead costs.  
The period 1992-97 laid the foundations for reforms in the banking system. It saw the 
implementation of prudential norms pertaining to capital adequacy, income recognition, asset 
classification, provisioning and exposure norms.  While these reforms were being implemented, 
the world economy also witnessed significant changes, ‘coinciding with the movement towards 
global integration of financial services’ (Government of India, 1998). Against such backdrop, a 
second government-appointed Committee on banking sector reforms provided the blueprint for 
the current reform process (Government of India, 1998). 
Significant reforms in the financial system during the reform period included several 
measures (Reddy, 2006; Nachane et al., 2007; Chairlone and Ghosh, 2009): 
(a) Lowering of statutory reserve requirements;  
(b) Liberalizing the interest rate regime, allowing banks the freedom to choose their deposit 
and lending rates.  
(c) Infusing competition by allowing more liberal entry of foreign banks and permitting the 
establishment of de novo private banks.  
(d) Introducing micro-prudential measures (capital adequacy requirements, income 
recognition, asset classification and provisioning norms for loans, exposure norms, accounting 
norms).  
 
As a consequence of the reforms, the share of state-owned banks in total assets of the 
banking system has declined by roughly one percent per annum over the reform period (Table 1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
An important aspect of the reforms process was the process of partial privatization of 
state-owned banks. The rationale for such privatization was elucidated in an influential report 
published by the Indian government (Government of India, 1991, 1998). It was argued that state-
owned banks should be encouraged to access the market to raise capital. This would serve a 
two-fold purpose. First, it would engender discipline in performance which would enhance 
shareholder value. Second, it would improve corporate governance in view of the responsibility 
cast on managements to manage their institutions through improvements in productivity and 
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efficiency. Accessing the market was the most practical way of augmenting capital, since an 
increase in net worth through internal accruals may not suffice to meet these needs. 
The privatization process in India was initiated in the early 1990s as part of its process of 
financial sector reforms. Accordingly, beginning 1993-94, the relevant banking Acts were 
amended to enhance the scope for partial private shareholding. Over the period 1994-2006, 19 
state-owned banks accessed the equity market, with several banks accessing the market with a 
follow-on offer and raised around Rs.196 billion (≈US$ 4.8 billion); the government shareholding 
in the divested banks range from 51.1-76.8% (RBI, 2006).  
 
4  Data and methods  
 Bank-wise data for the period beginning 1990, two years prior to the inception of financial 
sector reforms through 2006 are culled from the various issues of Report on Trend and Progress 
of Banking in India (RBI, various years, a) and Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India (RBI, 
various years, b), two yearly publications of the RBI which provides the annual audited figures on 
the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts and prudential ratios of individual banks, the 
highest frequency with which the data on the relevant variables are available on a consistent 
basis. The data has the advantage of being perfectly comparable across institutions, both before 
and after privatizations, as the central bank acting as regulator of the financial system requires 
the financial entities to present their balance sheets with the same accounts and criteria. Data on 
bank-level employment and number of branches are extracted from Performance Highlights of 
Banks, a yearly publication of Indian Banks’ Association (IBA, various years), the self-regulatory 
body of Indian banks.4 These banks, on average, accounted for nearly 80% of total banking 
sector assets over the reporting period. Finally, data on the macroeconomic and monetary 
variables are extracted from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy (RBI, 2006), an 
annual publication of the RBI which provides time-series data on macroeconomic and monetary 
variables.  
Following Boubakri et al. (2005), we employ four measures of performance: return on 
assets (RoA) as the profitability measure, net interest margin (NIM) as the measure of economic 
efficiency, non-performing loans to total loan ratio (NPL) as the measure of bank risk and capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) as the bank soundness measure.  
Borrowing from the literature on the modalities of enterprise restructuring (Grosfeld and 
Roland, 1995), we disaggregate restructuring as actions along four dimensions: employment 
(labor shedding); internal organization (branch rationalization, lower proportion of investment in 
government securities); operating efficiency and improved market discipline. 
We also include external environment factors, such as fiscal deficit to GDP ratio (fiscal), 
private investment to GDP (investment) and the foreign bank asset share in total banking assets 
(foreign). Finally, we control for the business cycle and the stance of monetary policy. To 
moderate the influence of noise, instead of the continuous variables – GDPGR and RIR – we 
employ dummy variables. 
                                                 
4 The financial year for banks runs from first day of April of a given year to the last day of March of the subsequent year. 
Accordingly, the year 1992 corresponds to the period 1991-92 (April-March) and so on, for the other years. 
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The primary concern of the study is to ascertain the effect of privatization on bank 
performance. Towards this end, we employ four explanatory variables to decompose the causes 
and effects of privatization. The first variable is PGO1, a dummy variable that equals one 
throughout the whole sample for banks that were privatized at some point during the sample 
period. To the extent that relatively strong banks were privatized, we expect it to have a positive 
coefficient. The second is PGO2, a dummy variable that equals one from the year a bank is 
privatized. While PGO1 controls for any selection effects associated with privatization, PGO2 
measures the effect of the privatization itself. The third variable following Boubakri et al. (2005) is 
PGO3 is equal to the number of years since the year of privatization. While PGO2 is included to 
capture the immediate effects of privatization, PGO3 captures the average yearly performance 
trend in the wake of privatization. The final variable PGO4 is the fraction of equity divested by the 
government in the concerned bank, akin to Gupta (2005).  
 
5  Results and discussion 
5.1 Univariate results 
 Table 2 reports comparisons of profitability, efficiency, bank soundness and risk 
measures for the state-owned banks. The results show a clear tendency for FGO banks to be 
less profitable than PGO ones. The differences in profitability appear to be economically 
important. For example, the average return on asset for PGO banks is 0.003, which far exceeds 
that of FGO banks. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The results on bank risk and soundness are also equally striking. FGO banks have 
statistically significant higher average NPLs and lower CAR than PGO banks. Similarly, FGO 
banks exhibit NIM which is much lower than PGO banks, although the evidence on this count is 
less compelling.  
 
5.2 Multivariate regressions 
 The univariate tests do not control for factors that might systematically impact bank 
performance. For one, we do not account for observable bank-level controls. Besides, the 
banking industry level factors are not taken on board. As well, the pace of economic activity and 
the stance of monetary policy could also be important considerations.  
We control for these factors in a multivariate regression framework. The regression 
model for bank j at time t is specified as:5 
jtttjtjtijt MZBfractionordummynivatizatioPerf εϕϕϕϕϕ +++++= 4321 )(Pr         (1)                             
 In (1), the concerned performance variable (Perf) is assumed to be a function of bank-
level controls (B), time-varying banking industry specific variables (Z), including foreign banks 
asset share and macroeconomic variables (M), such as real GDP growth and interest rate. ϕi is 
                                                 
5To examine the effect of the quantum of divestment on performance, we include PGO4 for each bank in a given year, 
instead of the dummy variable.  
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the bank fixed effect and ε is the error term. The coefficient of interest is ϕ1: its sign and 
significance determines the effect of privatization on the dependent variable.6 
The inclusion of lagged dependent variable (LDV) renders static panel estimation of (1) 
inconsistent. As a consequence, we resort to the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator to obtain consistent estimates of the above model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Such 
panel data techniques enables to control for potential endogeneity of privatization and the 
persistence in performance measures. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), the two-step GMM 
estimator is applied for inference on model specification. Specifically, with respect to the validity 
of instruments, we conduct a Sargan test for the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. We use the lags of all variables (in levels) from the second lag as 
instruments.  
The results, reported in Table 3, show that we are not able to reject the Sargan test. 
Moreover, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. In 
other words, this suggests that the GMM model is well specified. 
In Table 4, across all specifications, the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly 
significant, which is supportive of a persistence effect. More importantly, the evidence clearly 
indicates that relatively strong banks were chosen for privatization. The coefficient on PGO1 is 
positive and significant in the RoA regression, with a point estimate equal to 0.0008. The result is 
significant at the 0.10 level (t = 1.68). Likewise, the coefficient on PGO1 is positive and significant 
in the NIM and CAR regressions as well. This suggests that profitable banks, with high net 
interest margins and capital adequacy ratios were selected for partial privatization.   
 [Table 3 about here] 
Turning to the channels of performance improvement, the evidence indicates that 
profitability improvements were driven by workforce rationalization (negative coefficient on 
asset/employee) and containment in operating expenses (negative coefficient on Op.expn). 
Privatization led to containment in interest expense through improvements in market discipline 
(negative coefficient on deposit rate) by listing on stock exchanges. Likewise, CAR increases 
were driven by banks ‘over-investment’ in government securities: in a period of lackluster 
industrial demand and declining interest rates, significant investments in government paper led to 
improved treasury income, boosting profits and thereby, CAR. This perhaps also explains the 
positive sign on G-Secs in the RoA equation. The coefficient on branch is not unambiguous. On 
the one hand, bigger branch network enabled banks to mobilize (and deploy) low-cost deposits; 
on the other, this also led to higher NPLs, perhaps because of inadequate credit evaluation skills, 
especially in non-urban locales. 
Among the controls, the coefficient on size is negative in the RoA and NIM specification, 
reflecting a gradual squeezing of bank spreads and along with, profitability, consequent upon an 
increase in size of bank operations. The coefficient on foreign indicates that greater presence of 
foreign banks erodes profitability and margins, while raising NPLs. This concurs with the ‘cherry 
                                                 
6 The raw correlation between PGO1 and PGO2, PGO1 and PGO3 and between PGO2 and PGO3 are, respectively, 
0.48, 0.38 and 0.79. All of these are significant at the 0.01 level. In view of this, we include the privatization variables 
sequentially in the regression specifications. 
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picking’ hypothesis which suggests that foreign banks specialize in servicing good credit risks, 
leaving state-owned banks with less creditworthy borrowers, increasing the overall riskiness of 
their loan portfolio.  
In the final set of models, we include PGO4 among the regressors. The results clearly 
suggest an increase in divestment raises profitability. Thus, not only does partial privatization 
generate a sustained improvement in bank performance, these improvements are enhanced at 
higher levels of divestment. By way of example, in the RoA equation, raising privatization from 0 
to 49% is associated with a profitability increase by nearly 0.3 per cent (49 x 0.006). Not only 
profitability, but also bank risk and soundness witness improvement, post privatization. In the NPL 
equation, the point estimate on PGO4 is -0.066, suggesting that partially privatized banks have 
lower delinquent loans, presumably owing to their improved flexibility in credit extension and risk 
management practices. Consistent with univariate results, privatized banks also exhibit higher 
capital adequacy ratios. All of these coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels.   
 
5.3 Pre- vs. post-privatization 
The earlier analysis highlights that not only profitability, but also bank risk and soundness 
exhibit improvements consequent upon partial privatization. It does not, however, explore the 
time frame over which such benefits accrue to these banks. To examine this aspect, table 4 
presents the results of tests for changes in bank performance variables around the time when 
banks were privatized. Two sets of results are reported. In one set, average levels over the two 
years following privatization are compared with the average levels over the three years before 
privatization. In the other set, average levels over the three years following privatization are 
compared to average levels five years pre-privatization.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The short and long period comparisons yield broadly similar results. RoA increases and 
NPLs decline after privatization. Using either the short or long comparisons periods, these 
increases are significant. In contrast, increases in CAR after privatization are statistically 
significant only in the shorter period.  
 The evidence in table 6 supports the view that privatization should raise profitability and 
lower sticky loans. These tests, however, do not control for the general level of economic activity 
before and after privatization. They are therefore, not capable of distinguishing between changes 
in firm attributes arising from ordinary fluctuations in economic activity and those driven by 
changes in ownership.  
Taking this process forward, we perform a series of multivariate regressions that enable 
us to detect changes in firm attributes occurring before privatization, while controlling for the 
economic environment. Accordingly, we include three indicator variables. The variable PRE 
equals one if the observation is one or three years before the year of privatization, else zero. The 
Year 0 variable equals one if the observation is for the year in which privatization occurs and 
zero, otherwise. Finally, the variable POST equals one if the observation is for one to two years 
after the year of privatization, zero otherwise. Finally, akin to our baseline regressions, we include 
the set of bank-level controls, including those for the economic environment.  
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[Table 5 about here] 
As Table 5 indicates, neither profitability nor economic efficiency exhibits a perceptible 
increase before privatization. The coefficients on PRE are insignificant in RoA and NIM 
specifications. The evidence is, however, quite different when CAR is the dependent variable. 
Consider the CAR regression that does not include PGO4 among the regressors. The coefficient 
on POST is significantly positive and exceeds the coefficient of PRE. The differences between 
the coefficients of PRE and POST are, in fact, statistically significant. This indicates that 
improvements in CAR are reliably higher after privatization than during one to three years prior to 
privatization. 
The table also provides direct evidence on the relationship between private shareholding 
and performance. For all the regressions that include PGO4, the coefficient on this variable is 
significant and meaningful in three out of four specifications. This means that profitability and 
economic efficiency are higher when private shareholding is high (or alternately, government 
ownership is low). For example, the 0.029 coefficient on PGO4 in the RoA regression implies that 
a rise in private shareholding to 49% is associated with a 1.4% increase in RoA (49 x 0.029). 
Likewise, NPLs drop by 6.6% (49 x -0.134) consequent upon the rise in partial private 
shareholding. Hence, the overall evidence suggests that bank performance - judged in terms of 
profitability and bank risk - is enhanced consequent upon a lowering of government shareholding.     
 
6  Summary and conclusions  
 The partial privatization program in India, undertaken as part of the overall process of 
financial sector reforms, since the early 1990s, was aimed at improving the performance of state-
owned banks. While there have been several studies on bank performance, most studies of this 
genre have primarily focused on the efficiency versus ownership debate, with limited attention 
being paid to the impact of partial privatization on bank performance. With the government 
retaining management ownership even after privatization, the implication of such partial 
privatization on performance remains an open question.  
 In this context, the present study employs advanced panel data techniques to explore the 
performance of state-owned banks since the 1990s that encompasses the partial privatization 
program. We focus on several aspects of banks performance: profitability, efficiency, risk and 
soundness. The analysis indicates that FGO banks are significantly less profitable than PGO 
ones. This result is quite robust. It is apparent in simple univariate comparisons as well as in 
multivariate regressions that control for bank size and other financial ratios as well as the 
business cycle and monetary policy stance. Thus, the evidence tends to confirm the findings of 
Boardman and Vining (1989).  
 The evidence strongly suggests that privatization improves bank efficiency and 
soundness, while lowering bank risk. While the improvements in bank risk are typically spread out 
over a much longer period, the progress in terms of efficiency occurs in the post-privatization 
period. We broadly confirm the results of Megginson et al. (1994) who report significant increases 
in return on assets during the three years after privatization.  
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Table 1. Summary of the Banking Industry: 1989-90 to 2005-06 (Rs. billion) 
Year / Bank Group 1989-90 1996-97 2005-06 
SOB Private Foreign SOB Private Foreign SOB Private Foreign 
No. of banks 28 24 19 27 34 42 28 29 30 
Total asset 2580 99 129 5563 606 561 20148 5650 2016 
Total deposit 1840 78 70 4493 498 373 16225 4233 1138 
Total credit 1102 42 45 2202 281 265 11063 3096 976 
Credit-deposit ratio 0.60 0.54 0.64 0.49 0.56 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.86 
Share (in per cent)           
    Total asset 92 4 4 83 9 8 72 20 8 
    Total deposit 92 4 4 84 9 7 75 20 5 
    Total credit 93 4 3 80 10 10 73 20 7 
Total income 206 8.8 12 536 74 76 1609 436 174 
 of which: 
    interest income 
187 7.9 9.9 465 64 62 1376 345 122 
Total expenditure 201 8.5 10.4 540 61 56 1218 329 108 
 of which: 
    interest expenses 
142 5.3 6.6 309 31.7 32 802 214 51 
Net profit  5.0 0.3 1.6 71 13 20 160 50 31 
Bank asset/GDP 57.8 49.2 78.8 
SOB: State-owned banks; Private: Private sector banks; Foreign: Foreign banks 
 
 
Table 2. Univariate tests: PGO vs. FGO banks 
Variable PGO Observations FGO Observations t-statistic for 
difference 
RoA 0.003 299 (19) -0.0001 144 (9) 1.937** 
NIM 0.032 299 (19) 0.031 144 (9) 1.423 
NPL 0.129 245 (19) 0.157 117 (9) -2.077** 
CAR 0.107 263 (19) 0.089 126 (9) 2.149** 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
Number of banks within parentheses 
 
Table 3. Relative performance of PGO banks  
LDV 0.424 
(0.016)*** 
 0.113 
(0.024)*** 
0.112 
(0.025)*** 
0.644 
(0.044)*** 
0.829 
(0.056)*** 
0.127 
(0.013)*** 
0.129 
(0.012)*** 
PGO1 0.0008 
(0.0005)* 
 0.0007 
(0.0001)*** 
 -0.010 
(0.001)*** 
 0.001 
(0.0006)** 
 
PGO4  0.006 
(0.003)* 
 0.004 
(0.002)* 
 -0.066 
(0.022)*** 
 0.025 
(0.010)*** 
Channels         
Asset/ 
employee 
-0.001 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0005)*** 
      
Credit 
growth 
    -0.032 
(0.005)*** 
-0.029 
(0.005)*** 
  
Op. expn. -0.895 
(0.114)*** 
-0.888 
(0.119)*** 
    0.139 
(0.037)*** 
0.816 
(0.277)*** 
Dep. Rt   -0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
    
Branch 0.041 
(0.022)* 
0.039 
(0.023)* 
0.029 
(0.008)*** 
0.031 
(0.006)*** 
0.168 
(0.056)*** 
0.166 
(0.061)*** 
0.037 
(0.016)** 
0.031 
(0.017)* 
G-Secs 0.026 
(0.009)*** 
0.025 
(0.009)*** 
-0.022 
(0.005)*** 
-0.023 
(0.004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.026) 
-0.013 
(0.031) 
0.050 
(0.016)*** 
0.047 
(0.016)*** 
Macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size -0.026 
(0.005)*** 
-0.023 
(0.005)*** 
-0.055 
(0.005)*** 
-0.056 
(0.005)*** 
0.035 
(0.037) 
0.013 
(0.044) 
0.154 
(0.012)*** 
0.128 
(0.012)*** 
m1 -2.23 
(0.02)** 
-2.22 
(0.02)** 
-1.38 
(0.16) 
-1.25 
(0.21) 
-2.87 
(0.00)*** 
-3.36 
(0.00)*** 
-2.41 
(0.01)*** 
-2.44 
(0.01)*** 
m2 1.00 (0.31) 0.93 (0.35) -0.52 
(0.60) 
-0.58 
(0.56) 
1.23 (0.21) 0.59 (0.55) -0.82 
(0.41) 
-0.81 
(0.41) 
Sargan test  
(p-value) 
25.07 
(0.51) 
25.26 
(0.50) 
26.26 
(0.44) 
26.07 
(0.45) 
20.30 
(0.43) 
19.07 
(0.51) 
18.05 
(0.70) 
18.18 
(0.69) 
Period, 
banks 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-200, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
N.Obs 380 380 387 387 306 306 333 333 
Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
m1 and m2 are the first-order and second-order autocorrelation tests and follow N(0,1) 
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Table 4. Univariate test: Performance measures pre- versus post privatization 
Performance 
measure 
 Small window Difference 
POST – PRE 
(t-test, 
p-Values) 
Large window Difference 
POST – PRE 
(t-test, 
p-Values) 
  PRE (-3,-1) POST(+1, +2)  PRE (-5,-1) POST(+1, +3)  
RoA Mean 0.004 0.009 -4.499 
(0.00)*** 
0.003 0.009 -7.107 
(0.00)***  SD 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.004 
 Obs. 57 36 93 55 
NIM Mean 0.033 0.034 -0.538 
(0.59) 
0.033 0.034 -1.133 
(0.25)  SD 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.006 
 Obs. 57 36 93 55 
NPL Mean 0.123 0.098 2.266 (0.02)** 0.138 0.092 4.868 
(0.00)***  SD 0.054 0.048 0.058 0.048 
 Obs. 49 36 72 55 
CAR Mean 0.094 0.119 -5.686 
(0.00)*** 
0.107 0.123 -0.804 
(0.42)  SD 0.029 0.013 0.174 0.017 
 Obs. 53 36 80 55 
Standard errors in parentheses  
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
 
Table 5. Regression result: analysis of divested banks – small window 
 RoA NIM NPL CAR 
LDV 0.449 
(0.058)*** 
0.435 
(0.058)*** 
0.263 
(0.052)*** 
0.248 
(0.052)*** 
0.636 
(0.077)*** 
0.678 
(0.118)*** 
0.184 
(0.021)*** 
0.180 
(0.021)*** 
Year 0 0.0001 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.004 
(0.001)*** 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.007)*** 
0.016 
(0.008)** 
0.019 
(0.008)** 
PRE (-3,-1) -0.0009 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.001 (0.007) 0.002 (0.008) 
POST (+1, +2) -0.0005 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001)** 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.006)** 
0.014 
(0.006)** 
PGO4  0.029 
(0.015)** 
 -0.015 
(0.007)** 
 -0.134 
(0.036)** 
 0.034 (0.037) 
Controls         
Size -0.0004 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.005)*** 
-0.017 
(0.005)*** 
0.108 
(0.019)*** 
0.119 
(0.041)*** 
0.079 
(0.023)*** 
0.081 
(0.024)*** 
Fiscal -0.058 
(0.084) 
-0.054 
(0.083) 
-0.332 
(0.048)*** 
-0.332 
(0.048)*** 
0.250 
(0.034)*** 
0.241 
(0.035)*** 
-0.100 
(0.035)*** 
-0.101 
(0.036)*** 
Investment -0.524 
(0.099)*** 
-0.516 
(0.099)*** 
-0.079 
(0.040)*** 
-0.071 
(0.039)* 
0.183 
(0.027)*** 
0.180 
(0.032)*** 
-0.129 
(0.025)*** 
-0.122 
(0.026)*** 
Foreign -0.538 
(0.142)*** 
-0.557 
(0.141)*** 
-0.155 
(0.057)*** 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
0.199 
(0.024)*** 
0.111 
(0.025)*** 
-0.164 
(0.045)*** 
-0.166 
(0.046)*** 
m1 -9.57 
(0.00)*** 
-9.38 
(0.00)*** 
-8.42 
(0.00)*** 
-8.06 
(0.00)*** 
-2.78 
(0.00)*** 
-3.09 
(0.00)*** 
-3.92 
(0.00)*** 
-3.88 
(0.00)*** 
m2 1.01 (0.31) 1.00 (0.31) -0.59 (0.55) -0.47 (0.63) -0.47 (0.63) -0.51 (0.60) -0.91 (0.77) -0.97 (0.80) 
Sargan test  
(p-value) 
151.73 
(0.87) 
151.15 
(0.88) 
186.85 
(0.22) 
185.78 
(0.24) 
182.25 
(0.20) 
181.59 
(0.19) 
297.01 (0.88) 294.90 (0.89) 
Period, banks 1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1990-2006, 
28 
1994-2006, 
28 
1994-2006, 
28 
1993-2006, 
28 
1993-2006, 
28
N.Obs 414 414 414 414 306 306 333 333 
χ2 test :   
POST = PRE  
(p-Value) 
0.02  
(0.89) 
1.62  
(0.20) 
0.12  
(0.72) 
2.03  
(0.15) 
0.68  
(0.40) 
1.75  
(0.18) 
3.29 
(0.06)* 
3.35  
(0.06)* 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
m1 and m2 are the first-order and second-order autocorrelation tests and follow N(0,1)
 
